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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In early 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, Paul Rogers pied guilty to a single
count of possession of methamphetamine and was placed in the Ada County Drug
Court Program. In the summer of 2004, however, he was kicked out of drug court amid
allegations that he had attempted to start an adult entertainment business. Mr. Rogers
appealed.
In State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170 P.3d 881 (2007), the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the termination procedures used in removing Mr. Rogers from drug court
had violated Mr. Rogers' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it
remanded Mr. Rogers' case to the drug court for further proceedings. Upon remand
though, Mr. Rogers was again expelled from the drug court program.

Mr. Rogers

appeals again. 1
In this appeal, Mr. Rogers contends that there is insufficient evidence to support
one of the rules violations that the district court found. In addition, Mr. Rogers contends

1

The present appeal is the third to arise out of the same district court case. The first
appeal filed was Case No. 31264 initially and was assigned to the Idaho Court of
Appeals. However, when the Idaho Supreme Court granted review in that appeal, it
was re-denominated No. 33935. While the first appeal was still pending, Mr. Rogers
filed a second appeal, No. 32477. That appeal was actually resolved prior to any
disposition in Case Nos. 31264 / 33935. Ultimately, Mr. Rogers was largely successful
in Case Nos. 31264 / 33935, and his case was remanded to the district court. Following
the proceedings held on remand, Mr. Rogers initiated the present appeal.
Concurrently herewith, Mr. Rogers has filed a motion requesting that this Court
take judicial notice of the appellate records in Case Nos. 31264 / 33935 and 32477, all
of which are critical to a full understanding of the factual and procedural histories of the
present case. Assuming that that motion will be granted, the various records are all
cited herein and such citations are given with the appropriate case number as a prefix.

1

that the district court abused its discretion in determining that termination from drug
court was an appropriate sanction under the circumstances of this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Paul Rogers has struggled mightily with alcoholism and an addiction to
methamphetamine. (#31264 Presentence Investigation Presentence (hereinafter, PSI,
p.11.) Although he has long desired to quit drinking and using drugs, Mr. Rogers has
had some missteps on the road to clean and sober living. (#31264 PSI, p.11.)
Despite his addiction, Mr. Rogers has a remarkably sparse criminal history.2
(See #31264PSI, pp.3-4.) Nevertheless, on or about February 24, 2003, Mr. Rogers

was arrested and charged with one count of driving without privileges, a misdemeanor,
and one count of possession of methamphetamine, a felony. (#31264 R., pp.10-11; see
also #31264 R., pp.20-21 (Information).)

At some point, a plea agreement was struck whereby Mr. Rogers would plead
guilty to possession of methamphetamine and, in exchange, the State would dismiss
the driving without privileges charge and consent to Mr. Rogers' participation in the Ada
County Drug Court Program ("Program"). (See #31264 R., p.44 (court minutes outlining
terms of plea agreement); #31264 Tr., p.1, L. 12 - p.3, L.20 (change of plea hearing
transcript outlining the terms of the plea agreement and explicitly stating that the State's
consent to Mr. Rogers' participation in the Program was contingent upon his pleading
guilty to the possession charge).)

2

The present offense is Mr. Rogers' first felony conviction. (#31264 PSI, pp.3--4.)

2

On January 21, 2004, the State filed a Motion to Transfer .Case to Drug Court.
(#31264 R., p.38.)

On February 10, 2004, the district court granted that motion.

(#31264 R., p.40.)
The day after the district court granted the State's motion for drug court, on
February 11, 2004, Mr. Rogers executed a Guilty Plea Form for Drug Court Participants
and a Phase I - Contract. (See general/y#31264 R., pp.45-50, 51-52.) The guilty plea
form: (1) advised Mr. Rogers of his rights, including his right to a jury trial and his right
to the presumption of innocence (#31264 R., pp.45-46); (2) provided information
specific to drug court participants, including notice that Mr. Rogers was required to
plead guilty before being admitted to drug court, if Mr. Rogers was ever terminated from
drug court, he would then be sentenced for the offense charged, and if Mr. Rogers
successfully completed the program, his guilty plea would be withdrawn and the case
against him would be dismissed (#31264 R., pp.46-47); and (3) included a lengthy
questionnaire presumably calculated to ensure that Mr. Rogers understood what he was
getting himself into.

(See #31264 R., pp.47-50.)

The questionnaire verified that

Mr. Rogers had received and reviewed a copy of the Drug Court Participant Handbook
("Handbook"). 3 (#31264 R., p.50.)
The Phase I - Contract that Mr. Rogers signed set forth the conditions and rules
of the first of four phases of the Ada County Drug Court Program. Under the contract,
Mr. Rogers was required to: (1) attend all counseling sessions, including three group
meetings per week, individual treatment sessions as directed, and three 12-step support

3

Mr. Rogers also acknowledged receipt of the Handbook at his change of plea hearing.
(#31264 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-15.) Copies of the appropriate version of the Handbook were
augmented into the Record on Appeal in Case No. 33935.
3

groups per week; (2) complete all homework assignments; (3) inform his doctor of his
addiction and obtain written verification from his doctor if he was prescribed any
medication; (4) pay drug court fees; (5) submit to al! drug tests; (6) obtain a sponsor;
(7) comply with mentorship requirements; and (8) stay away from alcohol and drugs.
(#31264 R., pp.51-52.)
Interestingly, the Ada County Drug Court Participant Handbook ("Handbook")
which Mr. Rogers had acknowledged receiving, was never explicitly incorporated into
either the plea agreement or the Phase I - Contract. (See #31264 R., pp.45-50 (guilty
plea form), pp.51-52 (Phase I - Contract); #31264 Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.3, L.20 (portion of
change of plea hearing transcript wherein "the entire plea agreement" was stated on the
record).) Nevertheless, the Handbook sets forth many of the rules that Mr. Rogers was
required to follow in drug court. In a section entitled "Program Rules," the Handbook
sets forth six rules. Those rules are paraphrased as follows: (1) attend all treatment
sessions; (2) be on time for all treatment sessions; (3) do not make threats or behave
violently; (4) attend all drug court sessions; (5) abstain from the use of alcohol and illicit
drugs; and (6) maintain the confidentiality of other drug court participants. (Handbook,
p.3.) Elsewhere, the Handbook identifies additional rules: (1) participants must pay a
weekly fee, if they can; (2) participants must submit to drug tests; and (3) participants
must participate in counseling. (See Handbook, pp.4-5.)
On February 11, 2004, the district court held a change of plea hearing wherein
Mr. Rogers pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance as required by the plea
agreement.

(#31264 R., p.44; Tr., p.10, L.19.)

At that hearing, the district court

explained to Mr. Rogers that if he was terminated from the drug court program, he

4

would then proceed immediately to sentencing and could receive up to seven years in
state prison. (#31264 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-16.)
From March through June of 2004, Mr. Rogers participated in the Program. (See
generally #31264 Tr. pp.14-58 (transcripts of eleven status hearings regarding

Mr. Rogers' performance in the program).) During that time, Mr. Rogers did not perform
flawlessly, but none of his performance problems resulted in the sanction of termination,
and each and every one of those problems was dealt with through intermediate
sanctions imposed by the drug court judge.
Mr. Rogers' first drug court status hearing was on March 3, 2004. Admittedly, he
did not start off on the right foot. At that hearing, Mr. Rogers was confronted with the
fact that he had missed an orientation meeting and a urinalysis, and had also failed two
urinalyses.

(#31264 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-19.)

The drug court judge, however, allowed

Mr. Rogers to stay in the program. (#31264 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-9.) Evidently, the judge did
not want to terminate Mr. Rogers before he had had an opportunity to start getting
involved in the program.

(See #31264 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-15.) However, the judge did

impose the intermediate sanction of twelve days in jail. 4 (#31264 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8; p.15,
Ls.2-5.)

4

Apparently, a warrant had issued based on the referenced violations (the missed
orientation meeting, the missed urinalysis, and the failed urinalyses) and Mr. Rogers
had turned himself in. (#31264 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-9; 12-13; 20-25.) By the time of the
March 3, 2004, hearing, Mr. Rogers had already spent five days in jail. (#31264
Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8.) After recognizing that Mr. Rogers had already spent five days in jail,
the judge ordered him to serve an additional week in jail before being released back into
the drug court program. (#31264 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-9.)
5

A week later, Mr. Rogers attended another status hearing. At that hearing, the
drug court judge released Mr. Rogers from jail so that he could actually participate in the
drug court program. (#31264 Tr., p.19, L.16 - 20, L.7.)
Two weeks after that, at a hearing on March 24, 2004, the wisdom of the judge's
retaining Mr. Rogers in the drug court program was revealed when it became apparent
that Mr. Rogers had been making progress in the program.

The drug court judge

remarked as follows:
Mr. Rogers, it looks like you have had a nice tum-around since we saw
you last. You started off with kind of a rocky start with some missed UAs,
missed appointments, positive UAs, and that kind of thing.
But ever since you've been released from jail, you've really had a turnaround. Positive attitude, you've been present and on time for all of your
groups, and you've been attending your 12-step meetings, and your UAs
have been negative. So that's great.

Okay. All right. Well, keep it up. You're doing really well, Mr. Rogers.
We'll see you back here at 3 o'clock on the 14th.
(#31264 Tr., p.21, Ls.5-12; p.23, Ls.3-5 (emphasis added).)
At a hearing approximately a month later (on April 21, 2004), the fact that
Mr. Rogers had had a relapse was discussed. (#31264 Tr., p.24, Ls.4-9; p.26, L.13 p.27, L.6.) Based on Mr. Rogers' absconding and using drugs again, the judge ordered
that Mr. Rogers remain in jail and also write a letter explaining how he intended to
successfully complete the Program. (#31264 Tr., p.25, L.16 - p.26, L.5.) The judge
also made it clear that Mr. Rogers was on the cusp of termination based on his
commission of another felony. (See #31264 Tr., p.26, Ls.13-14, 22-23; p.27, Ls.1-4.)
A week later, on April 28, 2004, the drug court judge revealed that he had
"seriously considered just discharging [Mr. Rogers] from the program" the previous

6

week, but that he "was convinced that [Mr. Rogers was] worth another chance."
(#31264 Tr., p.29, Ls.4-9.)
(#31264 Tr., p.29, Ls.9-13.)

Indeed, the judge did give Mr. Rogers another chance.
But he also imposed more restrictive conditions upon

Mr. Rogers: "90 and 90."5 (#31264 Tr., p.29, L.14 - p.31, L.5.)
At the next status hearing, two weeks later (May 12, 2004), Mr. Rogers was
given the relatively mild sanction of four hours of community service for not timely
contacting his mentor. (#31264 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-13, 19-22.) Despite this transgression
though, the drug court judge noted that Mr. Rogers had been doing well in the program:
"Mr. Rogers, things were looking real well. . . . Other than that, Mr. Rogers, you have
been doing well. You have a good attitude. They tell me and you have shared openly

with the other members of your process group about what led to relapse, and so forth.
So you're doing a heck of a lot better than you were." {#31264 Tr., p.32, Ls.5-6, 14-19
(emphasis added).)
At the next status hearing, on May 26, 2004, the drug court judge had nothing but
praise for Mr. Rogers:
THE COURT: Paul Rogers. Mr. Rogers, looks like you are doing a really
good job. You have been actively engaged in your treatment, really
actively engaged it sounds like. Some sort of contact group or some sort
of contact with the treatment center or a group meeting or a class of some
kind every day of the week. Right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You have been present and on time for all of your groups
and all of your classes. Your 12-step attendance has been good, and just
make sure you really keep that up. I'm going to give you a Mr. Goodbar.
This is your first, isn't it?
5

"90 and 90" means that, for 90 consecutive days, the drug court participant must
attend a 12-step meeting every single day. (See #31264 Tr., p.29, L.14 - p.31, L5.)
7

THE DEFENDANT: Second one.
THE COURT: All right. You get a Mr. Goodbar for your good efforts. It
shows.
(#31264 Tr., p.34, Ls.4-11; p.34, L.22-p.35, L.5 (emphasis added).)
At the status hearing of June 9, 2004, the judge imposed a further sanction
against Mr. Rogers for failing to get a doctor's note acknowledging that he had told his
doctor that he was an addict in treatment, and for failing to find a sponsor. (#31264
Tr., p.36, Ls.23-24; p.37, Ls.12-14, 21-24.)

However, the judge decided that the

sanction should be a light one, one day of S.1.L.D., 6 because Mr. Rogers had been
present and on time for his groups and classes, his 12-step attendance was good, his
urinalyses had been negative, and he had been keeping in touch with his mentor.
(#31264 Tr., p.37, L.7 - p.38, L.1.) In fact, the judge noted that, but for Mr. Rogers'
failure to obtain a sponsor,7 he would have had a Mr. Goodbar coming because he had
been doing a good job in the program. (#31264 Tr., p.37, L.21-p.38, L.1.)
Mr. Rogers attended another status hearing on June 16, 2004, but that hearing
was relatively unremarkable in that the only issue that was discussed was the fact that
Mr. Rogers had not been able to complete his S.I.L.D. because he had had a heart
attack. (See genera/ly#31264 Tr., p.39, L.1 - p.43, L.11.)
On June 30, 2004, the drug court judge began the status hearing by
commending Mr. Rogers again for being punctual and for obtaining employment.

6

"S.I.L.D." stands for Sheriffs Inmate Labor Detail.
The judge actually said that he was imposing one day of S.I.L.D. for Mr. Rogers'
failure to contact his "mentor," but it appears that he misspoke and, in fact, meant to say
"sponsor." (Compare #31264 Tr., p.36, L.25- p.37, L.3 (admission that Mr. Rogers did
not have a sponsor) with #31264 Tr., p.37, Ls.14-20 (representing that Mr. Rogers had
been contacting his mentor "religiously").)
7

8

(#31264 Tr., p.44, Ls.5-10.) He then noted, however that "we have much bigger fish to
fry ... a much bigger concern that makes everything you're doing in drug court pale by
comparison," and went on to confront Mr. Rogers with the allegation that Mr. Rogers
had attempted to start a prostitution ring using the women in drug court as prostitutes.
(See generalfy #31264 Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.58, L.1.) In response to the judge's allegation,
Mr. Rogers explained that he and a partner had intended to start a business called
Desire, Inc., an adult entertainment company employing dancers and escorts, but that
the venture never got off the ground. (#31264 Tr., p.45, Ls.9-19; p.46, Ls.12-13; p.48,
Ls.14-17; p.54, Ls.14-24.) Nevertheless, the presiding judge seemed to have his mind
fairly well made up, stating: "I'm going to kick you out I think next week. I'm going to
give you an opportunity to show cause why I shouldn't .... You're in custody until then,
July 14th at 3 o'clock. I think what is happening here is that you're enticing female
members of the drug court program into prostitution." (#31264 Tr., p.52, Ls.19-21; p.53,
Ls.2-5.) However, the judge never indicated where his allegations had come from. 8

8

Attached to the PSI in Case No. 31264 are myriad notes from Mr. Rogers' treatment
team. Three sets of those notes-all of which came about on or after the day that
Mr. Rogers was confronted by the presiding judge-make unsubstantiated allegations
regarding "inappropriate . . . and possibly illegal" business ventures by Mr. Rogers.
(Drug Court Progress Reports (June 30, 2004).) The June 30, 2004, notes indicate that
the note-taker was "deeply disturbed" by what he or she perceived as the "callous
attitude," "[im]morality," and "[in]decency" of Mr. Rogers. (Drug Court Progress Reports
(June 30, 2004).) However, the only cited source of information in support of these
allegations was "the Probation & Parole office." (Drug Court Progress .Reports (June
30, 2004).) The July 14, 2004, notes indicate that Mr. Rogers has "attitudes about
women and sex as a commodity" which "are very toxic and damaging to those around
him, but they are completely devoid of a factual basis for that value judgment." (Drug
Court Progress Reports (July 14, 2004).) Finally, in the July 14, 2005, Discharge
Summary, Heidi Clark, one of Mr. Rogers' treatment providers, stated that she was
"deeply disturbed by the revelation of a much more sinister, callous side of' Mr. Rogers,
and she called him "closed-minded" and "uncaring," and accused him of having "no
regard for those around him." (Discharge Summary, p.1 (July 14, 2004).) She also
9

(See generally #31264 Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.58, L.1.) The only thing he said which would
shed any light on the source of the allegations was that "Dana Smith says that she
works for you." (#31264 Tr., p.51, Ls.9-10.) Interestingly, not only did Mr. Rogers deny
that Ms. Smith worked for him (#31264 Tr., p.51, Ls.9-15), but Ms. Smith, who
apparently happened to be in the courtroom at the time, asserted that she never said
that she had worked for Mr. Rogers. (#31264 Tr., p.55, Ls.3-4.) Ms. Smith explained
that she had said that she worked with Mr. Rogers at a cleaning company, not for him in
association with Desire, Inc. (#31264 Tr., p.55, L.3 - p.57, L.23.) She further explained
that she was then working as a laborer and concrete finisher for a company called
Alliance Equity Ventures which, although its name sounds similar to the Alliance
Company, a business owned by Mr. Rogers' would-be partner in the Desire, Inc.
venture, it is in no way affiliated with Mr. Rogers, his would-be partner, or any adult
entertainment business.

(#31264 Tr., p.55, L.3 - p.57, L.23.)

In response to

Ms. Smith's explanation, the presiding judge simply remarked, "[w]ell, it sounds terribly
phony to me. You're in custody. I'll see you in two weeks." (#31264 Tr., p.57, L.24 p.58, L.1.)

reiterated the belief that Mr. Rogers' attitudes about women and sex were "toxic" to
those around him. (Discharge Summary, p.1 (July 14, 2004).) The only support for all
of Ms. Clark's assertions and opinions was the statement of Mr. Rogers that had Desire,
Inc., gotten off the ground, his employees could engage in sex acts with their clients if
they chose to. (Discharge Summary, p.1 (July 14, 2004).)
Even if these notes from Mr. Rogers' treatment team did provide some factual
basis that could have supported the presiding judge's allegations, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the judge had, in fact, ever seen any of these notes (or that they
were even in existence at the time that the allegations surfaced) prior to confronting
Mr. Rogers, or that Mr. Rogers was ever informed of the existence of these notes or
given an opportunity to examine them.

10

Two weeks later, on July 14, 2004, the drug court judge brought Mr. Rogers back
to allow him an opportunity to show cause why he should not be terminated from the
Program. (See generally #31264 Tr., p.59, L.1 - p.63, L.19.) Mr. Rogers, arguing on
his own behalf, adamantly asserted that: (1) Desire, Inc. never got off the ground; (2)
Desire, Inc. was intended to be a legitimate adult entertainment business, not a
prostitution ring; (3) Dana Smith's statements were evidence that the presiding judge's
allegations were factually inaccurate; and (4) Mr. Rogers wanted to stay in drug court
because it was helping him. (#31264 Tr., p.60, L.4 - p.61, L.4; see also Letter to Judge
Wilper from Paul Rogers, pp.1-3 (filed July 6, 2004). 9) Mr. Rogers also made it clear
that he did not understand the factual basis of the judge's allegations by stating, "[y]our
honor, I don't know where you got all the info about what you thought is happening but
the staff is misleading you." (Letterto Judge Wilper from Paul Rogers, p.2 (filed July 6,
2004).) However, Mr. Rogers' arguments did not change the presiding judge's. opinion
in any way. As the district court stated:
I appreciate the fact that you don't think you did anything wrong. And
that's sort of my point. I'm not going to have you in drug court with 137
people, half of whom are females, where you don't think there is anything
in the world wrong with setting up an adult entertainment business called
Desires Inc., and charging $50 apiece for a finder's fee and having the
girls work outside. I think it certainly was an adult entertainment business
and you just can't do anything like that in drug court, particularly where
you don't think you are doing anything wrong.
(#31264 Tr., p.62, L.20 - p.63, L.7.) Again, the drug court judge gave no indication of
what facts may have supported his allegations. (See generally #31264 Tr., p.61, L.14 p.63, L.17.) The minutes from that hearing indicate that Mr. Rogers was "dropped" from

9

Mr. Rogers' letter is attached to the PSI in Case No. 31264.
11

the Program that day. (#31264 R., p.72.) In addition, a sentencing hearing date was
scheduled. (#31264 R., p.72; #31264 Tr. p.63, Ls.8-9.)
Prior to sentencing though, on August 11, 2004, Mr. Rogers, through his
appointed attorney, filed Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Dismissal from Drug Court
or, in the Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration on Dismissal from Drug Court. (See
generally #31264 R., pp.75-76.) The drug court judge, however, did not address that

motion until the September 30, 2004 sentencing hearing 10 at which time he denied
Mr. Rogers' request for an evidentiary hearing.
After denying Mr. Rogers' request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court
proceeded with the sentencing hearing. 11 (See generally, #31264 Tr., p.68, L.8- p.180,
L.6.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with four
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#31264 R., pp.86, 88; Tr., p.178,
Ls.5-8.) The district court then filed its Judgment of Conviction on October 1, 2004.
(#31264 R., pp.87-89.)
On February 22, 2005, at the conclusion of Mr. Rogers' "rider," the district court
suspended Mr. Rogers' sentence and placed him on probation. (#31264 R., pp.108,

10

The drug court judge, Judge Ronald J. Wilper, was the same Ada County district
court judge who sentenced Mr. Rogers.
11
It should be noted that Mr. Rogers' counsel called numerous witnesses whose
testimony, in the aggregate, tended to show that Mr. Rogers was not engaged in a
prostitution ring, but rather an adult entertainment business that never got off the
ground, and that this attempted business venture was the reason for his termination
from drug court. (See generally #31264 Tr., p.77, L.1 - p.150, L.15 (testimony of Sean
Kesling, Mr. Rogers' would-be business partner, Dana Smith, one of the women
Mr. Rogers supposedly solicited, and John Greene and Jeanette Day, drug court
treatment providers).) However, this testimony was too late for Mr. Rogers because he
had already been terminated from the program and, at best, could only hope to provide
evidence to mitigate against the unsupported conclusions that the district court had
already drawn.
12

109-113.) Six months later, on August 24, 2005, the State sought a bench warrant for
Mr. Rogers' arrest based on its contention that Mr. Rogers had committed nine separate
probation violations. (#32477 R., pp.11-12.) Pursuant to a second plea agreement,
Mr. Rogers ultimately admitted to three of the nine alleged violations and the State
dismissed the other six. (#32477 R., pp.22, 23.) On November 1, 2005, the district
court revoked Mr. Rogers' probation and ordered his sentence into execution. (#32477
R., pp.24, 25-26.) Mr. Rogers timely appealed that order in Supreme Court Case No.

32477.

(#32477 R., pp.28-29.)

On appeal, he argued that the district abused its

discretion by revoking probation. (See generally #32477 Appellant's Brief.) Ultimately,
however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order revoking probation and
ordering Mr. Rogers' sentence into execution.

State v. Rogers, No. 32477, 2007

Unpublished Opinion No. 302, pp.1-2 (Jan. 3, 2007).
In the meantime though, on October 20, 2004, Mr. Rogers, acting pro se, had
filed a Notice of Appeal, timely from the order terminating his participation in drug court,
initiating the present appeal. (#31264 R., pp.91-92.) On appeal, Mr. Rogers argued
that the district court erred in terminating his participation in drug court for two reasons.
First, he asserted that the district court denied him due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution because, inter alia, he was never
apprised of the evidence against him, he was never given the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and he was never allowed to present evidence on his
own behalf. Second, he argued that whether his due process rights were violated or
not, there was simply no factual or legal basis to terminate his participation in the
Program because the conduct at issue did not violate any of the drug court rules.

13

Although Mr. Rogers' arguments were unsuccessful at the Court of Appeals,
see State v. Rogers, No. 31264, 2006 Opinion No. 59 (Aug. 22, 2006) (withdrawn), the

Idaho Supreme Court granted review and, in a published decision, held that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Rogers was entitled to the same process that is due
parolees and probationers in revocation proceedings, and that he had been denied due
process in this case. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 743, 170 P.3d 881, 886 (2007).
The Supreme Court remanded Mr. Rogers' case to the district court for further
proceedings. Id.
On remand, the State filed a motion asking that Mr. Rogers again be terminated
from the Program.

(Motion for Discharge from Drug Court (Jan. 10, 2008).) 12 That

motion alleged some twenty different rules violations (Motion for Discharge from Drug
Court, pp.2-3), most of which had already been dealt with years ago through the
imposition of intermediate sanctions, but at least one of which-the failure to pay drug
court program fees (Motion for Discharge from Drug Court, p.3)-had not been
previously sanctioned.
The district court held an evidentiary I disposition / sentencing hearing on
March 17, 2008.

(See generally #35128 Tr., pp.33-210.) At that hearing, the State

withdrew two of the alleged violations (#35128 Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.36, L.2, p.38, Ls.1216), Mr. Rogers was acquitted of one of the alleged violations (#35128 Tr., p.182, L.15 p.183, L.6), and the district court found that the State had proved the remaining
seventeen alleged violations (see #35128 Tr., p.179, L.6 - p.184, L.11).

12

However,

The State's motion is attached to the State's September 10, 2008 Motion to Augment
the Record in this case (Case No. 35128).
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fifteen of the seventeen proven violations (all except for #15, "[s]oliciting drug court
participants to work in an adult entertainment business," and #20, "[f]ailing to pay drug
court program fees") had already been dealt with through intermediate sanctions before
Mr. Rogers was kicked out of drug court the first time. (Compare Motion for Discharge
from Drug Court, pp.2-3, with #31264 Tr., pp.14-43.)
Immediately after finding that Mr. Rogers had violated certain drug court rules,
the district court moved on to the matter of whether Mr. Rogers should be retained in
the drug court program.

(See #35128 Tr., p.185, Ls.11-17.)

Mr. Rogers' counsel

argued that, the rules violations notwithstanding, Mr. Rogers should be retained in the
drug court program. (#35128 Tr., p.185, L.18 - p.186, L.10.) The prosecutor, on the
other hand, urged the district court to expel Mr. Rogers from drug court.

(#35128

Tr., p.188, L.10 - p.190.)

(#35128

The district court went the way of termination.

Tr., p.190, L.7 - p.191, L.1.)

It reasoned that "the violations, at the time that they

occurred, were repeated, and they were in total certainly egregious enough to
necessitate expulsion." (#35128, p.190, Ls.22-25.)
After expelling Mr. Rogers from drug court, with the consent of the parties (see
#35128 Tr., p.192, Ls.8-20, p.194, L.21 - p.195, L.6) the district court proceeded to
sentencing. Mr. Rogers' counsel argued for sentence equivalent to the time Mr. Rogers'
had already served (over two and a half years) or, in the alternative, a suspended
sentence with a six-month term of probation. (#35128 Tr., p.186, L.18 - p.188, L.2,
p.199, L.16 - p.19.)

The prosecutor, on the other hand, asked for a suspended

sentence of five years, with one year fixed, and approximately a year and a half on
probation (until October 1, 2009, the date Mr. Rogers apparently would have topped out
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had his prior sentence still been valid). (#35128 Tr., p.196, L.1 - p.199, L.13.) The
district court ultimately adopted the State's recommendation, imposing a suspended
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, and placing Mr. Rogers on probation until
October 1, 2009. (#35128 Tr., p.203, L.7 - 204, L.11.) The following day, on March 18,
2008, the district court entered its judgment of conviction. (#35128 R., pp.30-34.)
On March 21, 2008, Mr. Rogers filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

(#35128

R., pp.38-40.) On appeal, he contends that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support
the district court's finding that Mr. Rogers violated the drug court rules by "[s]oliciting
drug court participants to work in an adult entertainment business," and (2) the district
court abused its discretion in terminating Mr. Rogers' participation in drug court.
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ISSUES
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Mr. Rogers
violated the drug court rules by "soliciting drug court participants to work in an adult
entertainment business?"
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it terminated Mr. Rogers' participation
in drug court?
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ARGUMENT

I.
There Is Insufficient Evidence To Support The District Court's Finding That Mr. Rogers
Violated The Drug Court Rules By "Soliciting Drug Court Participants To Work In An
Adult Entertainment Business"
One of the two "new" rules violations that the district court found at the March 17,
2008 hearing in this case was that he had solicited drug court participants to work in his
adult entertainment business. Specifically, it found as follows:
I also find that the defendant did solicit drug court participants to
work in an adult entertainment business called Desires Inc. And if it
weren't for the fact that we have Exhibit 6 and the defendant's admission
that he passed out the Desires Inc. card with his phone number to several
different drug court participants, I might not have enough evidence to
make that finding. But there's more than enough evidence for the court to
find he did in fact pass out the business cards. He has admitted at various
times that he did.

His explanation for why he passed out the business cards to the
drug court participants as just wanting to give them a telephone number in
case they wanted to get ahold of him, I don't find that to be ·credible.
And so I do find that the defendant violated his drug court contract.
Condition No. 13 says that you can't be empfoyed by another drug coutt
patticipant. And if he was attempting to have at least one, and probably
more than one, other drug court participant that would go two work for him
at Desires Inc.
(#35128 Tr., p.180, L.20 - p.18, L.18 (emphasis added).) However, as set forth below,
there is insufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion.
In the Idaho Supreme Court's published opinion in Mr. Rogers' earlier appeal, the
Court held that where the State seeks to remove a participant from drug court, that
participant is entitled to the same due process protections as a parolee or probationer
against whom revocation is sought. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 743, 170 P.3d
881, 886 (2007). That means that the State must prove a drug court rules violation
18

before the participant can be removed from drug court. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 479-80.
In this case, the State has failed to prove any rules violation with regard to the
allegation that Mr. Rogers "[s]olicit[ed] drug court participants to work in an adult
entertainment business" (Motion for Discharge from Drug Court, p.2) because, even if
the district court's factual finding that Mr. Rogers solicited potential employees is not
clearly erroneous, 13 that "fact" was not a violation of any of the rules that Mr. Rogers
had agreed to abide by. Although the district court talked about "Condition No. 13" of
the "drug court contract" prohibiting one drug court participant from employing another,
the contract contains no such prohibition.

In fact, the Phase I - Contract that

Mr. Rogers signed when he entered drug court only contains ten rules, none of which
say anything about drug court participants' working arrangements. (#31264 R., pp.5152.) Moreover, although the district court may have been referring to the drug court
handbook when it spoke of "Condition No. 13," the version of the Handbook that was
provided to Mr. Rogers (the February 2002 Edition) includes no such Condition No. 13;
it has six explicit rules and a couple of implied rules, and none of those rules say
anything about drug court participants working for one another. 14 (See Handbook, pp.3-

13

It is hard to imagine how merely handing out business cards equates to soliciting
potential employees.
14
In Case No. 31264, the State successfully augmented the record on appeal with the
September 2002 Edition of the Handbook. That augmentation was based on the
affidavit of counsel for the State asserting that the Ada County Drug Court Coordinator's
Office had represented that this was the version of the Handbook that was in effect at all
times relevant to Mr. Rogers' case, and this was the version of the Handbook
referenced in Mr. Rogers' guilty plea form. (#31264 Motion to Augment Record and
Statement in Support Thereof (Feb. 22, 2006); #31264 Order Granting Motion to
Augment the Record (Mar. 30, 2006).) That augmentation was consistent with the
testimony of Maureen Baker-Burton, the Ada County Drug Court Coordinator, who
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5.) Accordingly, the State failed to prove that Mr. Rogers' attempt to solicit other drug
court participants to come work for him {assuming that he actually did so) violated any
of the drug court rules.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Terminated Mr. Rogers' Participation In
Drug Court
Even if the State failed to prove that Mr. Rogers violated the drug court rules by
soliciting other drug court participants to come work for him, Mr. Rogers does concede
that he violated the rules by failing to pay the drug court program fees.

{See Ada

County Drug Court Participant Handbook, February 2002 Edition, p.4 (making it clear
that all participants must pay $15 per week if they are able to do so); #35128 Tr., p.183,
testified on remand that the September 2002 Edition of the Handbook was the version
of the Handbook that was in effect during the timeframe relevant to Mr. Rogers' case.
(#35128 Tr., p.81, Ls.9-19.)
Ms. Baker-Burton's repeated claims notwithstanding, the question of which
version of the Handbook Mr. Rogers agreed to be bound by when he entered drug court
was resolved in Case No. 33935. In that case, which was the continuation of Case No.
31264 on review, Mr. Rogers submitted a motion, and multiple affidavits, making it clear
that the version of the Handbook that had been provided to him was the February 2002
Edition. (See #33935 Motion to Strike and Motion to Augment Record (Aug. 23, 2007);
#33935 Affidavit of Paul L Rogers (Aug. 23, 2007); #33935 Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen
(Aug. 23, 2007).) Ultimately, the Supreme Court found Mr. Rogers' argument
compelling, as it struck the September 2002 Edition of the Handbook from the record on
appeal, and replaced it with the February 2002 Edition of the Handbook. (#33935 Order
Granting Motion to Strike and Motion to Augment Record (Aug. 29, 2007).) That is now
the law of the case.
Nevertheless, even if the September 2002 Edition of the Handbook were
controlling, that version, although it contains a thirteenth rule, says nothing about drug
court participants working for one another. (Ada County Drug Court Handbook,
September 2002 Edition, p.4 (attached to the Court of Appeals' Opinion in Case No.
31264).) Thus, one can only conclude that the district court's belief that there was a
rule prohibiting drug court participants from working for one another was derived from a
more current version of the Handbook. (According to the State, the Handbook was
amended again in December 2004. (#31264 Motion to Augment the Record and
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Ls.7-18 (district court finding that Mr. Rogers failed to pay any of the program fees
despite an ability to pay at least some of those costs).) Thus, it was proper for the
district court to have addressed the question of whether termination was an appropriate
sanction. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80.
Mr. Rogers contends, however, that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that termination was an appropriate sanction. 15 As should be clear from the
above statement of facts, Mr. Rogers struggled in drug court initially, but at that time,
the district court did not believe his transgressions to be worthy of termination. It was
only when the escort business allegations surfaced that the State saw fit to have
Mr. Rogers removed from drug court, and the district court saw fit accede to that
request. However, as discussed above, even if the State's allegations about soliciting
drug court participants to work in an escort business are true, the escort business was
not improper. Therefore, Mr. Rogers submits that he should not have been kicked out
of drug court for his contemplation of a legal and proper escort business, or for failing to
pay the program fees that he could scarcely afford to pay. Moreover, by the time of the
district court's termination decision, on March 17, 2008, Mr. Rogers had been granted
parole, and had been living successfully (and cleanly) in the community for over a year
and, thus, was better positioned than ever to succeed in the drug court program. (See
#35128Tr., p.199, Ls.17-22, p.200, Ls.17-19.)

Statement in Support Thereof, p.1 n.1 (Feb. 22, 2006.) Thus, it may well have been
amended in response to Mr. Rogers' case.)
15
Monissey makes it fairly clear that the termination decision is discretionary on the part
of the drug court. See Monissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Rogers respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his conviction and sentence, reverse the district court's order terminating his
participation in drug court, and remand this case with an instruction that Mr. Rogers be
allowed to continue in drug court.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2009.

~ -

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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